India-China - No Give, No Take

We stand alone

There is now a monotonous regularity in this and no resolution seems to be in sight, let alone be discussed. There was a time when with a little bit of give and take this contentious and now protracted problem seemed solvable.

In 1960 Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai visiting New Delhi suggested something akin to a status quo as a permanent solution. This was repeated in 1982 by Chairman Deng Xiaoping to India’s Ambassador in Beijing, G Parthasarathy. Once again it was offered during Rajiv Gandhi’s tenure as Prime Minister to the then Indian Ambassador AP Venkateshwaran by the then Chinese PM, Zhao Ziyang.

But when Rajiv Gandhi visited Beijing in 1988, both countries decided to keep a permanent solution aside and focus on immediate doable’s. All along India felt that the internal political situation will not allow the government of the day the room to go with it.

What is commonly referred to as the “Border Dispute” between India and China has now manifested itself into two distinct disputes? The first is the dispute over two large and separated tracts of territories. One is Aksai Chin, a virtually uninhabited high altitude desert expanse of about 37000 square kilometers. The other is what is now the Indian state of Arunachal Pradesh, a diversely populated hill region with a population of around 1.4 million people spread out over 84,000 square kilometers, which China claims as Lower Tibet.

Aksai Chin lies between the state of Jammu and Kashmir, and China’s Xinjiang province, both regions that are also riven by separatist conflicts. Arunachal Pradesh borders Tibet, which also has a separation conflict with China. India claims that these borders were agreed upon by British India, and independent or semi-independent authorities, in Xinjiang and Tibet in the early days of the last century. China doesn’t agree with these. Both countries agree that these are legacies of history and cannot be solved in the immediate or near term and best be left to the future to resolve.

But what causes the frequent frictions between the two is that they do not have agreed Lines of Actual Control (LAC) to separate the jurisdictions under the control of the armies of the two countries. The perceptions of the LAC differ at many places. At some places it might be by just a few meters, and elsewhere by tens of kilometers.

To minimize the inflammability due to actively patrolling of security personnel of both sides, the two countries have a Border Defence Cooperation Agreement (BDCA) that sets out norms of behavior for both sides. The important things being that nothing of a permanent nature will be built on these disputed areas, and that the patrols take all precautions not to confront each other. Which simply means, if they come face to face they will both withdraw.

The corollary to this is that the patrols will not tail each other. The agreement also requires local commanders to frequently meet and exchange views and sort out local differences across the table.

Despite the adverse geographical and climatic conditions, and the overarching tensions between Asia’s biggest economies, the troops on the ground are able to show surprising bonhomie and friendliness. But periodically, either due to misunderstanding or local level posturing by either side, there are frictions that threaten to erupt into a conflict with use of arms. But it has not happened since 1967 when the two armies fought a fierce localized battle in the Sikkim sector, quite close to where the Dokolam confrontation took place.

The two countries have been engaged in frequent talks at various levels since 1981. After Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi’s visit to Beijing in 1988, both countries had agreed to set up a task force to find a solution to the “border issue”. Chairman Deng welcoming his “ young friend” suggested they “forget the past” as they stood in the center of the cavernous Great Hall of the People and the handshake lasted three long minutes.

For three long decades since then the two countries have been meeting to discuss the border issue, but so far we have seen unwillingness by both sides to forget the past. Since 2003 these talks were elevated to a high level political dialogue between Special Representatives, in India’s case the National Security Advisor and in China’s case an official at the level of State Councilor.

The first meeting at this level took place between Indian NSA Brajesh Mishra and Chinese State Councilor Dai Bing Guo.We had the 22th round of this dialog between India’s National Security Advisor, Ajit Doval, and China’s State Councilor and Foreign Minister, Wang Yi in New Delhi in December 2019.

A former Indian NSA once told me that the talks are high in style and hospitality, with the Indian side trying hard to match the Chinese, but there has been little traction. This is because of the versions of the claims that have been internalized and now form public opinion in both countries. Both countries are gripped by strong nationalism bordering on jingoism, which makes give and take, so vital in the resolution of such vexatious disputes, extremely difficult.

But the Border Defence Cooperation Agreement is a major outcome of these talks and that has by and large worked. The next logical step of these talks should be to agree on an LAC. But unfortunately even that is now being weighed down by aggressive nationalism driven by social media that equates “giving up” with national loss of face. This is something increasingly very important to both countries. We will not be seen giving up anything, even our obduracy and historical short sightedness.

Both countries are now very different then what they were in the last century. In 1962 the Cold War was at its peak. China and Russia had not yet fully fallen apart. Both were excruciatingly poor. China’s per capita income was half India’s. But it had fought the USA to a halt in Korea and its troops were battle hardened and better armed.

Both, India and China, are now relatively prosperous and militarily powerful. The rise of a new nationalism has also led to a hardening of hearts. Neither now seems capable of giving or taking.

We will have to wait for a sensible give and take for another time. To add to our confusion, many strategic thinkers in India now labour under the illusion that when push gives to shove our recent bonhomie with the USA will translate into active cooperation.

That’s just deluding ourselves. We stand-alone.