WTO’s ‘Crown Jewel’ Under Existential Crisis: Problem Explained

World Trade Organization (WTO) is an international body that acts as a watchdog keeping an eye on the rules of trade between nations. WTO came into operation in 1995 and was founded as a successor to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), which was incorporated in 1948. It acts as a forum where WTO members discuss and negotiate trade issues. Moreover, it works in the form of different multilateral as well as plurilateral WTO agreements. These agreements live at the heart of WTO as they deal with different aspects of trade policy.  Agreements like General Agreement on Trades and Tariffs; General Agreement on Trade in Services; The Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights etc. forms the centerpiece of WTO.  Through these agreements, one WTO member enters into obligations and formulates the relation of reciprocity with the other WTO member.

Undeniably, the Dispute Settlement System (DSS) that works under the WTO is considered to be the ‘crown jewel’. No matter how stringent the laws are, unless they couldn’t be enforced, they are of not much worth. DSS functions as an effective mechanism to settle disputes and to enforce obligations in case of violation by any WTO member.  The ration d’etre of giving birth to DSS was to ensure settlement of disputes in a timely and structured manner.  DSS is committed to impede and further mitigate trade imbalances between stronger and weaker players by having their disputes to be settled on the verge of rules and not power. Since the day it came into force in 1995, 595 disputes have been brought before the DSS and out of which 350+ disputes are settled.

DSS is governed by the Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) through the rules incorporated in Disputes Settlement Understanding (DSU).  The DSS works as a two-tier redressal forum and is the most important and busiest international tribunal having a binding authority on the parties to the dispute once they adopt the report of findings. On the first level comes the Consultation as per Article 4 of the DSU rules. Article 4 states that “each WTO member undertakes to accord sympathetic consideration to and afford adequate opportunity for consultation regarding any representations made by another Member concerning measures affecting the operation of any covered agreement taken within the territory of the former.” Therefore, Consultation is mandatory before any dispute is addressed to DSB. Once the consultation is failed, the complaining party can request the DSB under Article 6 for the establishment of a panel body that shall aim to settle the disputes between the parties.

On the top of the hierarchy comes the appellate body which shall hear the appeal from panel cases. Any party to the dispute can formally notify DSB of its decision to appeal. Under Article 17 of the DSU rules, DSB shall establish a standing appellate body. Unlike the Panel body, the appellate body is a permanent body composed of seven persons out of which three shall serve on any one case. These members are appointed for a term of four years. It is the duty of DSB to ensure that the vacancies shall be filled as they arise so as to confirm the smooth and timely functioning of the hierarchical mechanism of dispute redressal. Principally, the decision under DSB is taken through consensus methodology. Article 2.4 of DSU explains this method stating that “the consensus is said to be achieved when no WTO member, present at the meeting, formally opposes to the proposed decision”.

The genesis of the crisis is attributable to the U.S. who through its non-consensus has blocked the selection procedure to fill the vacancies alarming in the Appellate Body. The minimum requirement for Appellate Body to function is at least three persons out of total strength of seven. However, on 11^th December 2019, the term of two of the remaining three members came to an end. At present, the Appellate Body has only one member and thus, it is dysfunctional and the resolution mechanism has brought to a grinding halt. The political façade started long back in 2017 when the U.S. cleared its intention of not allowing the selection procedure to taken place in order to fill the vacancies in the Appellate Body. Nonetheless, the Appellate Body continued its function as the compositional requirement was manageable due to the tenure of three of its members remaining but ultimately the crisis knocked the doors of WTO in the last month of 2019.

Although, at present, the composition of the Panel Body has not been interjected and the process of addressing disputes through Panel Body is still in continuance. However, the problem is as per the trends, in 67 percent of the cases, one of the parties to the dispute appeals the finding of the panel body and thus; when the Appellate Body is itself dysfunctional, the order remains non-binding and the whole mechanism of the dispute resolution is disrupted severing the gravity of the political disaster. The reasons for the U.S. to block the normal functioning of the Appellate Body have been shared with other countries as well. Fortunately, no other country has repelled in the way the U.S. is exclaiming to address the loopholes. The dissatisfaction of the U.S. administration with the WTO is not a secret anymore when Mr. Donald Trump labeled the WTO as ‘disaster’ for their nation.

The reason for the U.S. to express dissatisfaction is because of the overreaching power that Appellate Body enjoys. To combat that, on a lighter note, the U.S. has shown a preference of going back to the non-binding dispute settlement system that was prevalent at the time of GATT, 1948. Ironically, it was the U.S. who during the Uruguay round of negotiations (1986-1994) pressured and voted for creating a dispute redressal system that is binding and enforceable, however as the tables have turned now and the Appellate Body has become an irksome affair for the U.S.

The central issue of the U.S. to cordon the appointment revolves around the problem ofjudicial overreach.  To elaborate the claim, the U.S. believes that the dispute settlement system interprets the WTO rules in such a way that instead of simplifying, it rather creates new obligations for the WTO members. What the U.S. believes is that the Appellate Body drifts away from its original mandate due to its practice of issuing decisions that either burden the WTO members with new obligations or diminishes the right they enjoyed earlier.

Further, the U.S. has raised the objections against the procedural irregularities by the Appellate Body. Entangling the issues of the procedure, firstly, the U.S.has pointed out the contradiction of the DSU rules adopted by the WTO members and the Appellate Body Working procedure which are drawn up by the Appellate Body itself. As per the Rule 15 of the latter, it allows the Appellate Body members to remain on board and to continue to serve on appeals which are pending during their terms; however, as per Article 17.9 of the former, a member enjoys the position for a fixed four-year term. Thus, the Appellate Body working procedures violate the provisional requirement as laid down in DSU rules.

The second procedural issue raised by the U.S. deals with the violation of completing the report by Appellate Body within the time frame of 90 days as prescribed by the DSU rules. The US has pointed out that the extraordinary delay violates the mandate of a speedy trial and further it negates the right of the complaining party as well as the party brought to dispute due to the hauling of their economies to a hiatus. It is the belief of the U.S. that the prospective incapacitation of the Appellate Body is undoubtedly a menace for the WTO and its members because once the report of panel body is appealed, it cannot be made enforceable unless the appellate body decides and thus, it holds the country for the indefinite timeframe not authorizing the party to retaliate on whose favour the panel body decided the dispute.

It is indisputable that the DSS need to undergo a series of reform in order to gain the lost confidence. Unfortunately, the step taken by the U.S. has been termed as harsh and politically motivated. One move of the U.S. has paralyzed the ability of the ‘crown jewel’ to resolve international trade disputes. Even going against the decision of the U.S. and outcasting the consensus power it holds won’t serve the purpose as the U.S. is an important player of WTO and if the U.S. is not a party to it; the WTO would be synonymous to a toothless tiger. 

Nevertheless, arbitration under Article 25 of the DSU rules can act as an alternative to the hierarchal redressal system, as well as, solving disputes through bilateral agreements can be another alternative during the time of this existential crisis. The proposed idea of forming a Multi-party Interim Appellate arrangement will not succumb for long because the U.S. will not be its part and as it is certain, U.S. forms a considerable part of international trade, thus, there will again be a situation of deadlock. Moreover, choosing such interim mechanisms for the long run can raise a threat to the uniformity of rulings that WTO embraces. All in all, WTO is currently under jeopardy and it can be the beginning of the end if a solution to the crisis is not found in a timely manner. As of now, the Supreme Court of the international Trade ceases to exist and is in a life or death moment.